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This chapter examines the historic major legislative acts that established the 
current Simplified Acquisitions Procedures (SAP).  A brief synopsis of each legislation 
action will be provided as well as a chronological timeline.  The government’s stance on 
SAP will be explained and the benefits of SAP over traditional acquisition methods will 
be explored.  Finally the theoretical potential of SAP will be outlined.  
A. HISTORY (THE SHORT STORY) 
Prior to the 1990s, federal acquisitions were often characterized as complicated, 
requiring compliance with numerous rules and a lot of paperwork.  One requirement was 
that in traditional large contracts the contractor must follow over 100 statues.  Some 
statues, which serve as examples, are  
• Certified Cost and Pricing Data under the Truth in Negotiations Act1 
• Performing book keeping in accordance with government Cost 
Accounting Standards (FAR part 30 and 31)2, (FAR part 23.5) 
•  the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-690)3, (FAR 22.6) 
•  Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (41 U.S.C. 35-45)4. 
                                                 
1 Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) is a public law enacted for the purpose of providing for full and 
fair disclosure by contractors in the conduct of negotiations with the government. The most significant 
provision included in TINA is the requirement that contractors submit certified cost and pricing data for 
negotiated procurements above a defined threshold.  
2 The purpose of this Cost Accounting Standard is to ensure that each contractor’s practices used in 
estimating costs for a proposal are consistent with cost accounting practices used by him in accumulating 
and reporting costs.  Consistency in the application of cost accounting practices is necessary to enhance the 
likelihood that comparable transactions are treated alike. With respect to individual contracts, the consistent 
application of cost accounting practices will facilitate the preparation of reliable cost estimates used in 
pricing a proposal and their comparison with the costs of performance of the resulting contract. Such 
comparisons provide one important basis for financial control over costs during contract performance and 
aid in establishing accountability for cost in the manner agreed to by both parties at the time of contracting. 
The comparisons also provide an improved basis for evaluating estimating capabilities. 
3 Drug Free workplace act -No offeror other than an individual shall be considered a responsible 
source (see 9.104-1(g) and 19.602-1(a)(2)(i)) for a contract that exceeds the simplified acquisition 
threshold, unless it agrees that it will provide a drug-free workplace.  
4 Walsh-Healy Act - A public law designed to prevent the practice of "bid brokering," i.e., the practice 
of buying items and then reselling them to the government without the adding of any value to the item by 
the reseller. The Act provides that contracts subject to its provisions (generally contracts over $10,000) may 
be awarded only to "manufacturers" or "regular dealers," as defined.  
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These statues were all originally intended to ensure that the government was 
getting a good deal, and that the contracting officer could easily justify any actions taken.  
A Coopers and Lybrand study was performed which stated that 18% of the purchase price 
of an acquisition was due to government regulations [1, 2, 3, Appendix A].  Not only is 
this cost a huge barrier to entry for small businesses to sell to the government, but it also 
limits the number of competing offers the government receives on any given solicitation.  
With fewer responses, competition is limited and the government actually ends up with a 
product that may not be the best solution, but simply the only available one. 
In the mid-1990s there was a shift in importance from a strict adherence to a 
plethora of regulations to a more business-like model of acquisitions.  The motive behind 
the new way of thinking was to get a better deal for the money.  Acquisition reform 
gained significant momentum during the presidency of William Clinton and with 
influential reformers such as Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, the former Undersecretary of 
Defense (AT&L) who has written many documents involving better business practices 
and commercial items5, and Virginia’s Republican Representative Tom Davis, who 
currently leads the Committee on Government Reform and is involved in many 
legislative reform efforts [4].  Each of these reformists explains how the government 
would be better served by reforming acquisition to be more closely reflective of the 
commercial sector by using best business practices. 
After the ending of the Cold War, the Department of Defense underwent cutbacks 
and restructuring to reduce the number of acquisition personnel from 250,000 to less than 
124,000 [5].  The thought was that the large acquisition infrastructure in place during the 
Cold War was no longer required to maintain the only world superpower.  The personnel 
reduction was meant to streamline the process and cut waste.  The problem was that the 
use of commercial contracts for goods and services increased as the requirements from 
the Cold War decreased.  The issue now is that the cutbacks do not correspond to the 
workload.  The Department of Defense has increased the use of contract services and 
items, especially since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  The initial idea of 
                                                 
5 A few notable documents by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler that may be of interest for further background 
are: “A Vision of the Government as a World-Class Buyer: Major Procurement Issues for the Coming 
Decade” and “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government.” 
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cutting back while still providing outstanding service to the taxpayers is obtainable.  The 
government has tried many initiatives aimed at doing more with less, by capitalizing on 
commercial business best practices and implementing them into government acquisition 
policy and legislation.   
1. Legislative Acts to Streamline the Acquisition Process 
In the past, there has been legislation to accomplish greater productivity while 
using less of the American taxpayers’ resources.   The commercial world began to be 
replicated in order to capitalize on business practices that could make the government 
more efficient.   
A few recent and notable legislative attempts have been made to streamline the 
acquisition process. The following are examples of some of these legislative attempts: 
• Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
• Federal Acquisition Reform Act  (FARA) of 1995 
• Clinger-Cohen Act 1996 
• The E-Government Act 2002 
• Service Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) 2003 
• Acquisition System Improvement Act (ASIA) introduced in 2005 which 
some aspects have passed 
• General Service Administration Modernization Act (GSAMA) 2005 
These legislative statues are explained in the next few sections. 
a. FASA (Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act)  
FASA was the first major reform legislation and was enacted in 1994.  It 
helped alleviate the need to comply with a set of rigid rules in each procurement.  Due to 
the excessive regulations in the FAR, DFAR, and general government policies such as 
TINA (refer to footnote 2) and CAS (refer to footnote 3), many businesses could not 
afford to or simply refused to do business with the government.  
FASA helped to unburden commercial businesses by eliminating many 
statutory compliance requirements and creating a preference for “commercial items” in 
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government procurement.   The definition of a commercial item6 is more detailed, but in 
essence it is anything offered or actually rented, leased, or sold to the public.   
With a commercial item designation, a company no longer was required to 
provide certified cost and price data, as well as other costly oversight-based documents. It 
also gave relief from the Walsh-Healy Act, which required anyone selling to the 
government on contracts worth more than $10,000 to provide proof that they were 
manufacturers or the regular dealers of the goods being bought.  In addition, FASA also 
encouraged a preference for commercial item procurement, with a stronger reliance on 
the market and industry to establish a “fair and reasonable” price.  FASA also listed a 
number of laws which would now be inapplicable at the Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures (SAP) level [Appendix B]. 
b. FARA (Federal Acquisition Reform Act) of 1995  
FARA is a reform legislation that logically follows in FASA’s footsteps.  
FARA not only agreed with FASA on preference for commercial items, but also 
expanded the definition to include: items that evolved from a commercial item, a 
commercial item that was slightly modified to fit the government’s needs, non-
developmental items, and some services.  These services now included services at a 
catalog price or in combination with a commercial item.  
With FASA and FARA now in legislation, there was an extreme shift to 
buy on the open market, with full and open competition when at all possible, and pay the 
going market price just like a business would do.  The idea behind this legislation was 
that doing away with the extra red tape required by the government would lower prices 
without sacrificing quality.  This idea was documented in a study which identified the 
statutory cost drivers that increased the price of items procured by the DOD [1].   
                                                 
6 A commercial item is any item, other than real property, that is of a type customarily used by the 
general public or by non-governmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes, and (i) has 
been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or, (ii) has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the 
general public; any item that evolved from an item described in paragraph (1) or services of a type offered 
and sold competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace.  
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According to the study, the extra documentation the government required (to keep costs 
low) raised costs by 18%.  By using the commercial item designation, this extra cost can 
be done away with.  
c. The E-Government Act of 2002 
The E-Government Act of 2002 "authorized the use of share-in-savings 
contracting for information technology.  Share-in savings contracts represent an 
innovative, performance-based approach to procurement that encourages industry to 
share technology and solutions with the government – without large ‘up-front’ costs to 
the taxpayer.  They are, in essence, turbo charged performance-based contracts." [6]   
Share-in savings contracts were created so that there would be an incentive for private 
contractors to act more fiscally responsible and to incentivize them to save the 
government money in information technology contracts, while using a performance-
based approach.  It encouraged private industry to share technology with the government 
without a large upfront cost to the tax payer.  As stated by Congressman Davis, “The 
genius is in the simplicity: the more a company saves the government, the more it gets 
paid…” [7]  It seemed like a good idea, but did it work? 
As of December 2004, there was not a single share-in–savings contract 
awarded.  The act had not really taken off because the implementing guidance that was to 
accompany the act was not completed.  GAO (Government Accountability Office) 
recently reported back to Congress that, “…agency officials are reluctant to use share-in-
savings contracting until the implementing regulations are finalized…” [6]  
The agency acquisition councils began working on a regulatory policy 
when the President signed the E-Government Act and published a first draft in October 
2003. It was subsequently updated by the councils in July 2004, and the councils were 
ready to issue the finished product just a few months ago in 2005.  OMB (Office of 
Management and Budget) decided to wait to make sure that the rules correctly addressed 
situations to include but not limited to funding of termination and retention of the 




d. ASIA (Acquisition System Improvement Act) of 2005 
ASIA of 2005, introduced by Representatives Tom Davis and Dan Burton, 
extended the Clinger-Cohen Act for two years until January 2009. While still under 
House review, seven provisions were implemented in the 2005 Defense Appropriations 
Act.  The pilot program [8], which authorized streamlined acquisition procedures, applies 
to purchases equal to or less than $5 million dollars when a contracting officer reasonably 
expects that offers in response to a solicitation will only include commercial items. It 
allows for shorter deadlines, fewer government requirements, and lower administrative 
costs.  It includes provisions for sharing savings from contracting efficiencies within 
businesses and creates a government-industry exchange program for acquisition 
professionals between government agencies and federal contractors to expose 
government contracting officers to best practices in the private sector acquisition fields. 
This part of the act is known as ASIA Redux [9].  ASIA also consolidates various agency 
contract appeals boards into two, one for defense agencies and one for civilian agencies 
at the General Services Administration, and increases time to 20 days for protests of an 
award to the head of an agency [10].   In summation, the provisions give contracting 
officers greater flexibility to award contracts to the company that offers the best 
government deal.  Is this program working? 
It is evident that ASIA or the extended Clinger-Cohen Act is helping to 
speed up acquisitions.  The following testimony was presented on the House floor by 
Tom Davis on April 9, 2002, which concerned the Clinger-Cohen Act extension and was 
used to help rebuild the Pentagon after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
One significant step at the Pentagon has been the efforts to quickly 
restore what DoD calls the 'critical pathway' to the damaged wing. 
DoD used the Clinger-Cohen pilot program authority to buy 
routers and switches to re-establish the communications grid. 
Using conventional procurement procedures to buy this equipment 
would have added many extra months and would have jeopardized 





e. General Services Administration Modernization Act (GSAMA) 
GSAMA was responsible for merging the agency's two acquisition arms, 
the Federal Supply Service and Federal Technology Service.  The organization is 
structured with six offices throughout the country that report to a national office, which 
sets policy and leads initiatives such as strategic sourcing and the effort to leverage 
agencies' buying power in purchasing goods and services [11].  The organizations were 
originally separated because information technology used was easily defined, but today it 
mixes with other goods and services. An item like a network cable being laid during 
construction fell into a grey area where it technically was two sets of money and this 
caused problems. With the GSA Modernization Act, the cross-functional items in the 
grey zone can now be purchased more easily and faster.   
The GSA Modernization Act also establishes “retention bonuses and 
reemployment relief aimed at maintaining the strength and experience of the federal 
government’s civilian acquisition workforce.” [12]  Basically, if a retired worker who is 
receiving benefits is rehired into an acquisitions field, he or she can still receive his or her 
annuity from the previous retirement.  This is to directly combat the large number of 
acquisition employees retiring in 2005. 
All of the above-mentioned acts were introduced with the idea that 
government procurement should incorporate commercial best practices into government 
procedures.  Representative Davis, subcommittee chairman, stated, "The government is 
not utilizing commercial best practices [in acquisition]…" [13] when he introduced the 
new legislation. Congressman Davis is a big proponent for the government following 
commercial policies to streamline acquisitions activities and ensure the most efficient use 
of taxpayer money, while reducing oversight to increase response time.  This is a 
tremendous help to contracting officers to become more responsive to the end user’s 






B. WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S STANCE ON 
SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES? 
The policy of the federal government is, “Agencies shall use simplified 
acquisition procedures to the maximum extent practicable for all purchases of supplies or 
services not exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold (including purchases at or 
below the micro-purchase threshold).” [14]  There are exceptions of course and other 
criteria, but the intent is to use simplified acquisitions procedures as much as possible.  
Congress has passed legislation and the Federal Acquisitions Regulations have mirrored 
the idea that SAP is a good program with monetary, as well as time, benefits.   
C. WHAT ARE SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITIONS PROCEDURES? 
Simplified Acquisitions Procedures (SAP) are a way to capitalize on the above- 
mentioned legislative intent.  SAP cuts the statutory regulations that are required to do 
business with the government, and relieves the contracting officer of many unneeded 
procedural and statutory requirements.  The federal government is trying to do more with 
less, and the traditional way of doing business requires a lot of time and paperwork.  SAP 
reduces the personnel and time required on each acquisition.  The legislation provides 
relief from all of the statutory “red tape” that slows the system down.  According to the 
FAR Part 13, Simplified acquisition procedures are established 
 
 …in order to                                                                 
(a) Reduce administrative costs;                                                                                               
(b) Improve opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, women-owned, 
Veteran-owned, HUB Zone, and service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business concerns to obtain a fair proportion of Government contracts; 
(c) Promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and 
(d) Avoid unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors. [15] 
 
SAP is a way of promoting the socio-economic goals of the federal government, 
increasing responsiveness to the end users, cutting down on unnecessary paperwork, 
reducing cost, and essentially creating a new way to do business, which is in keeping 
with the commercial business practices of society.   
 
 9
D. WHAT DOES SAP ALLOW THAT IS BETTER THAN TRADITIONAL 
ACQUISITIONS? 
SAP allows for immediate response to a request by an end user.  The subpart 13.5 
test program for certain commercial items takes the legislation provided for SAP and 
extends it.  By using SAP, contracting officers have much more leeway to get done what 
needs to happen.  While still following the FAR, a contracting officer using SAP can 
make a purchase the same day if there is an urgency of need for a commercial item.   
With technology advancing so rapidly, sometimes a commercial item can be 
bought for less money than contracting someone to make it.  Items like contracted photo 
copier services could easily be researched by a government individual.  The individual 
could compare all of the costs of suitable companies in the service area, choose the 
lowest price, a technically acceptable service provider and write a contract, which could 
all happen very quickly.  SAP allows this to happen more simply than the traditional 
approach of placing a solicitation on the web site, waiting the minimum of 30 days, 
comparing the responses, choosing from those who provide a response, and then moving 
into the contract writing.  This can easily take at least 90 days under the traditional 
acquisitions process.  After all of that effort, a contracting officer may not end up with the 
lowest price possible for that service, but simply the lowest price of those who respond.   
SAP is not the best solution for every acquisition, but it is a wonderful tool when 
used correctly.  Obviously the next generation Stealth fighter would not be a good use of 
SAP, but in the commercial item realm, there is an almost endless potential savings in 
both money and time.   
SAP offers speed, simplicity, reduced advertising time, less elaborate descriptions 
in the criteria for selection, use of commercial clauses for commercial item description 
and limits contract types to only fixed-price type contracts.  Because contract types are 
limited to firm fixed-price and fixed-price with economic price adjustments, the business 
relationships are simplified and clear.  When SAP is used, a contracting officer can waive 
the normal advertising period if a need is urgent and requires immediate action.  This 
advertising period does not have to be cut short, and a full and open competition can still 
be used if so desired.   
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Another benefit for SAP is less elaborate descriptions in the selection criteria 
documentation.  Since the item being purchased is a commercially recognized product, it 
is sufficient to use normal industry language and standards when describing selection 
criteria, thus abbreviating the source selection criteria.  Examples include using 
commercially recognized standards like standard film speed, lumes of light, watt usage, 
number of pixels, etc.  These types of descriptions have consistent industry standards that 
do not require lengthy explanations about the desired outcome.  Due to the commercial 
item designation, only fixed-price type contracts can be used as there is a prevailing fair 
and reasonable market price already established for the commercial market.   
An additional benefit is to have a simplified and abbreviated acquisition plan.  It 
is no longer necessary to lay out the entire plan and reasons for each step.  It is 
advantageous not to plan weighted guidelines, plans for negotiations, pre- and post-
negotiation memorandums, and other documents which would be part of the entire 
planning process. Using SAP, a contracting office ensures that he or she is fulfilling the 
requirements listed in FAR part 13.5 and purchases the best valued item.  Elaborate 
documentation is not required in the official record. 
Traditional acquisitions procedures are much slower and more complex.  There 
are many contract types available under a traditional procurement method that require 
longer times to perform each step, and because the purchase is so complicated, many 
more documents are required to ensure the acquisition is truly the best value the 
government can receive.  There are many checks and balances built into the process that 
take time and effort to accomplish correctly.  Traditional procurements require much 
more management oversight, thus limiting individual responsibility and requiring many 








SAP acquisitions Traditional acquisitions 
Speed - The ability to modify 
advertisement periods can significantly 
decrease possible procurement time in 
event of an urgent situation. 
Long procurement times - Ensures 
adequate advertising for competition and 
all aspects are explored prior to award. 
Economy - Cost per transaction decreases 
as time spent on each procurement is cut 
and man-hours significantly reduced. 
Lack of economy - Each transaction is 
labor intensive with long time requirements 
and many required steps in the process, and 
the cost per transaction goes up in an 
attempt to save money. 
Responsiveness- Broad participation by 
many manufacturers ensures the customer’s 
needs are met. No special requirements for 
dealing with the government entice a larger 
competition base to choose an item from. 
Lack of responsiveness- The linty of 
requirements to do business with the 
government preclude some products from 
being considered.  Some companies are not 
willing to sell to the government with so 
many restrictions and requirements (e.g. 
SYSCO). 
Simplicity- There is a lot to be said about 
understanding every step of a process and 
being proficient at all of them. 
Complex- Many steps, many requirements, 
not many experienced contract specialists 
qualified to award contracts. 
Table 1.   Comparisons of SAP Vise Traditional Acquisitions 
  
E. WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL POTENTIAL OF SAP? 
The potential of SAP, if implemented in every contracting office to its fullest 
potential, addresses complaints of not responding quickly as well as the significant cuts in 
man power.  SAP will also save a measurable amount of money.  SAP can help move the 
government's spending into the new age. According to a GAO study, “…If agencies were 
to build on their initial experiences and duplicate these steps government wide, they 
would have the opportunity to save the taxpayer almost $300 million annually.” [16]  No 
longer is America fighting the Cold War with countless major acquisitions, where 
defense spending is something spread across many years.  The Marine Corps has been 
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nicknamed America’s 911 force in readiness.  The Marine Corps incorporates many types 
of war-fighting equipment and training to react instantaneously to a threat.  Maritime 
Propositioned Force (MPF) is sailing worldwide in order to support an operation 
instantly.  Marines are on standby and ready to deploy across the world.  MEUs (Marine 
Expeditionary Unit) are constantly training and deploying to be ready at the word of the 
President or Congress.  America is prepared to do battle with very little notice.   
America has seen the need to update and modernized its approach.  SAP is one 
more tool that is attempting to modernize the acquisition approach.  In order to keep pace 
with the war-fighters, the acquisition force must also be able to respond quickly.  When 
dealing with SAP, it is also possible to receive discounts that have been pre-negotiated by 
the GSA and other federal agencies.  In each area, a representative could organize and 
establish discounted prices and when the item is needed, simply go to that location and 
purchase at the discounted rate.  The capitalization of the savings SAP has to offer has 
just begun.   
F. SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITIONS IS BETTER BUSINESS  
SAP is the future direction of better business practices because it offers a solution 
to the problem the acquisition workforces faces.  SAP offers compensation for work force 
cuts without adding the extra expense of hiring additional personnel, it calls for faster and 
more responsiveness to the needs of the war-fighters, and it entices many businesses to 
participate in offering services or products to the government which would have 
















II. WHAT THE IDEAL MODEL WOULD LOOK LIKE 
This chapter demonstrates what an ideal model for Simplified Acquisitions would 
look like in a perfect world, as originally intended by the legislators.  The ideal model of 
how Simplified Acquisitions should be handled is just that - simple.  The legislators 
intended to lessen the burden of the federal acquisition procedures for both the 
commercial world and the acquisition workforce.   
A. HOW IS THE FAR LANGUAGE DESIGNED? 
The relationship between legal case precedence legislation and stances and policy 
ideas are combined at the DAR council.   All potential legislation combined with 
acquisition professionals draft FAR language to eventually be a change to the FAR.  The 
language is posted for public opinion and then reviewed at a later date.  Suggestions from 
the public are either followed, modified or disregarded as constructive inputs.  Once the 
review is complete and modifications are made, the language is officially added to the 
FAR as a change. 
Ideally the language in the FAR should be a clear guide to let contractors and 
contracting officers know exactly what the law requires, but sometimes the intent of the 
legislation gets clouded through this process.  That is what happened in the case of FAR 
part 13.5.   
The original legal drafters intended one outcome, but once it made its way 
through the process and was put into the FAR, the actual language was not as originally 
intended.  In an interview with the drafters of the legislation on Congressman Davis’ staff 
and Professor Cory Yoder at NPS in October 2005, this question was addressed.  The 
original drafters intended for the FAR to be changed to allow SAP purchases under the 
test program to be simple, effective, responsive, and, most of all, less labor intensive.  
With the DAR council process, the legislation intended by the legal staff eventually 
ended up segmented within different parts of the FAR (FAR 6, 12, 13, 15) and was not 




B. WHAT IS THE ORIGINAL INTENT?  
The intent is echoed by Congressman Davis’ staff and many renowned reform 
advocates like Dr. Gansler.  SAP should ideally be very flexible.  It relies on the 
judgment of the contracting officer to use sound business practices and to be innovative.  
Through this process, there will be a tradeoff between flexibility and oversight 
documents, but in reality, that is the purpose, which is to clear the red tape to make way 
for cost savings. 
C. HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT THE FAR? 
In an ideal world, the FAR would have a very clear section dedicated to the SAP.  
It would not only define what laws are no longer applicable to contractors, but it would 
also define what documents and steps in the traditional procedures are no longer required.  
In an ideal world, the FAR would reflect the exact intent of the original legislation.  The 
FAR would allow for some interpretation, but explain the basics so that it is clear on the 
use of SAP.   
D. HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT THE DFAR? 
Additionally, in a perfect world the DFARS would go into great detail to explain 
the steps of SAP, using the FAR as a guide as to what documents are no longer required.  
This is where it is essential that the intent to create less work must be clear.  Human 
nature is to modify a new requirement to fit an existing set-up.  Ideally, the DFAR would 
demand a culture shift towards accepting SAP as the preferred method for acquisition and 
only using traditional methods when SAP did not apply.   
E. HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT THE NAVY MARINE CORPS 
ACQUISITION GUIDE (NMCAG) AND MARINE CORPS 
PROCUREMENT SUPPLEMENT (MAPS)? 
The Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Guide (NMCAG) and Marine Corps 
Procurement Supplement (MAPS) would, in this ideal world, further explain and 
consolidate all information as they currently do, but would also incorporate this new SAP 
idea.  The NMCAG would further detail the application of the FAR and DFAR to the 
naval service, while still keeping under the original intent of SAP.  The MAPS would 
also, in this ideal would, accurately reflect the intent of all guiding policies and statues, 
while specifically guiding contracting personnel to the sections that pertain most to the 
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Marine Corps' way of application.  It would be essential then that the MAPS detail the 
preference for using SAP.  It would also be essential for the MAPS to not further restrict 
any policy or documentation of SAP, which would add extra oversight documents or 
procedures and not keep with the original intent of legislation.   
The original intent of the test case was designed for using this ideal SAP system 
and applying the best business practices of competition, the socioeconomic goal 
programs, and any sole source instructions from other parts of the FAR.  SAP was not 
designed to add-on extra checks and balances.  There is a tradeoff the legislators agreed 
to when they passed the statues, and the same tradeoffs of oversight for efficiency need to 
be accepted.  By allowing each step along the chain of command to add more stringent 
requirements beyond the FAR, it creates inefficiencies and mutates the legislative intent.  
The idea of SAP was to lessen workload, save money, time and paperwork, while 
increasing creativity and flexibility of the contracting officer to do more with less.  If 
requirements from the traditional system remain in place, it hinders the outcome.  To 
increase the effectiveness of the FAR 13.5 test case requires simplifying to the fullest 





























Figure 1.   Ideal Model Using SAP  
 
The above diagram, Figure 1, is meant to show how simple the entire process can 
be when Simplified Acquisition Procedures are applied.  Three basic steps are all that is 
required.  First, a request is generated by the end user.  Then, the contracting officer 
receives and begins work immediately by soliciting quotes, selecting a contractor, and 
purchasing the item immediately.  Finally, the item is delivered to the end user.  SAP is 









Step (1) - War-
fighter has a need 
and requests item. 
Step (2) - Contracting 
Officer has authority to 
solicit quotes, select 
contractor, and purchase 
item immediately. 
Step (3) - War-
fighter receives 
equipment and wins 
the war! 
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III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter explains the investigation performed for the research leading to this 
paper.  The methodology for collecting data and the actual data will be examined.  Why 
the Regional Contracting Office South West (RCOSW) was chosen and who is 
encompassed within the RCOSW will be explained.  The data collected in raw form will 
be summarized into easy-to-understand tables and visual representations will be made for 
each as applicable.  The intent is to extrapolate, via the data provided, a current view of 
what is being executed at the RCOSW. In addition, some conclusions will be reached as 
to the applicability of SAP to various factual data. 
A. WHAT WAS THE METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING CAMP 
PENDLETON RCOSW? 
The rational for collecting data was based on studying the largest Marine Corps 
Contracting Office with the most responsibility.  This office most accurately depicts the 
majority of the country’s contracting procedures and is representative of the Marine 
Corps as a whole in its applicability of policy.  Appendix B of the MAPS lists all buying 
offices in the Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps is divided into three geographic MEFs 
(Marine Expeditionary Forces) located at Camp Pendleton (I MEF), Camp Lejune (II 
MEF), and Okinawa Japan (III MEF).  Their associated contracting offices should all be 
set up the same and they should be the largest.  This, however, was a wrong assumption.  
Each buying office is set up according to their commander’s ideas of what would best 
serve their using units.  Each office is also set up with different geographical areas of 
responsibility and differences in size.  The RCOSW is based out of Camp Pendleton and 
basically handles all contracting needs west of the Mississippi river.  This by far was the 
largest area.  The other buying areas are called Regional Contracting Offices (RCO), but 
in reality each only supports a few using units.  With this in mind, data was collected 
from Camp Pendleton. As stated in Appendix B of the MAPS [17], the Regional 




1. "MCB Camp Pendleton 
2. PPMAP & KO appointments for MCAS YUMA, MCAS MIRAMAR, MCLB 
Barstow, Marine Corps District Headquarters (8th, 9th, 12th), all recruiting 
stations west of the Mississippi river, MCMWTC Bridgeport, CKO 1st FSSG 
(while in Garrison) 
3. All Marine Corps Units not otherwise identified in the states of AK, AZ, CA, 
CO, ID, MT, ND, NE, NM, NV, OR, SD, UT, WA, WY." [17], The RCOSW 
occasionally supports other Department of Defense and federal agencies in the 
area requesting assistance.  
Data was only collected from the regional office in Camp Pendleton, as it is the 
by far the largest contracting office.  The analysis is not limited to but includes the 
following:  
1. A study of their internal policies and standard operating procedures was 
performed.  
2. Raw data from their awards database was collected and analyzed for fiscal 
years 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
3. Personal interviews were conducted, both in person and by other 
communication methods, such as e-mail and telephone.  
B. WHAT WAS EXAMINED?  
Policies, guides, legislation, professional reading materials, and all orders 
pertaining to these actions were examined in addition to the data.  Contracting procedures 
were studied from requests to awards.  The personnel along each of the process steps 
were interviewed, both Marine and civilian.  When possible, all references used by each 
person interviewed were reviewed.  Questions were asked of all people in the process, not 
limited to but including the following:  what the people did in the process, what 
references they used, how the references were applied, why the process was set up in the 
way it was, what problems they saw in the process, how they might improve the process 
if allowed to make changes, what works best, what works the worst, and what 
reoccurring problems were seen regularly. 
Data was collected for the last three years of all purchases made from that office, 
due to the sensitivity of the individual purchase information.  The database is not 
provided, but a summary of what was found is detailed in the following table: 
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Purchase Agency and Type Amount in U.S. Dollars 
SAP purchases made by 1st FSSG during 
OIF (OIF is defined as OIF I-the war)     
483,583,137.62 
GCPC purchases made by 1FSSG during 
OIF                
 
319,422.40 
SAP purchases made by RCOSW 3,895,913.20 
GSA purchases made by the RCOSW 195,420,425.77 
Contracts written by Formal Contracts 
division:              
353,377,257.28 
Negotiated by HQMC or SF33                       54,115,904.00 
Written by Formal Contracts 
w/SF1449/1599/mods        
169,946,939.9 
Written by Formal Contracts for 
commercial items         
24,567,852.64 
 
Written by Formal Contracts for items 
w/SF1449 under “P” type contracts 
24,240,961.29 
Written by Formal Contracts for items 
commercial items under a “P” type contract
80,505,599.46 
Total FSSG 483,902,560.02 
Total RCOSW 552,693,596.25 
  
Overall total: 1,036,596,156.26 
Table 2.   Database Totals Categorized 
 
C. WHAT DOES THIS DATA MEAN? 
Table 2 depicts the basic break down of purchases from the years 2003, 2004 and 
2005.  The monetary award amounts were added for each type of contract awarded 
during this time period and categorized by types of acquisition methods used to purchase 
the items (government purchase card (GCPC), SAP, traditional large contracts, and 
GSA).  To break down the categories even further, the types of solicitations used were 
also broken out, simply for ease of understanding.  The above chart is representative of 
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all the information provided from the database.  The entire database was divided into 
contract types, branch which the purchase was made, and type of purchase.  These totals 
aid in describing how money is being spent in the procurements made by the RCOSW. 
The breakdowns below are geared towards explaining these specific ideas.  
 
Purchase Agency Amount in U.S. Dollars 
RCOSW 3,895,913.20 
FSSG deployed 483,583,137.62 
Overall SAP total 487,479,050.82 
Table 3.   Simplified Acquisitions for RCOSW Including FSSG Deployed 
 
Table 3 shows the total dollar amount of the SAP purchases in both the RCOSW 
and FSSG deployed.  This table demonstrates the dollar value of the executed SAP 
purchases. The major point demonstrated here is that the FSSG deployed is making a 
higher volume of SAP buys compared to the RCOSW.  
 
Purchase Agency Type Amount in U.S. 
Dollars 
% of Overall Total 
RCOSW Large Contracts 353,377,257.28 34.09% 
RCOSW SAP 3,895,913.20 0.38% 
RCOSW GSA purchases 195,420,425.77 18.85% 
FSSG deployed GCPC 319,422.40 0.03% 
FSSG deployed SAP 483,583,137.62 46.65% 

























RCOSW Large Contracts FSSG SAP
RCOSW SAP RCOSW GSA purchases
FSSG GCPC
 
Figure 2.   Overall Percentages Pie Chart of Data in Table 4  
 
Table 4 and Figure 2 depict the total dollar value of every contract written, 
expressed in percentages for each category. The contracts written totaled $1,036,596,156 
and were split up by types of buys and by awarding organization.  These depictions 
demonstrate what percent of the total purchase dollars are being spent by which 
organizations and how that money is spent.  This depiction also shows that SAP 
purchases by the FSSG deployed make up 47% of the total dollars spent in the time 
period studied.  The large contracts division of the RCOSW accounted for 34% of the 
total dollars spent in the three years studied. GSA buys from the RCOSW was the next 
largest dollar volume.  What is an important takeaway from this breakdown is that the 
SAP for the RCOSW and GCPC for FSSG deployed are both an insignificant amount of 
the total spent in the last three years of contract awards.  Another important takeaway is 
that the SAP for FSSG deployed is the largest category, accounting for 47% of the total  
dollar purchases made in the time period.  This shows a significant use of the procedures.  
Another important point is that 66% of the overall total of acquisitions was spent using 
SAP and GSA. 
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Table 5.   Percentages of Own Agency’s Buys 
 
 

















RCOSW Large Contracts FSSG SAP
RCOSW SAP RCOSW GSA purchases
FSSG GCPC
 
Figure 3.   Diagram of Percent of Own Agency’s Buys 
 
Table 5 and Figure 3 show the SAP purchases as a percent of the unit’s overall 
purchases.  Almost all of the FSSG’s purchases use SAP, while the remaining purchases 
use the GCPC.  The GCPC is in itself a variant of SAP.  This chart shows that the FSSG 
uses SAP for its purchases unless otherwise noted.  SAP was used extensively by the 
FSSG.  On the other hand, the RCOSW uses GSA and SAP sparingly and the GSA buys 
Purchase 
Agency 
Type Amount in U.S. 
Dollars 
Agency Total % of  Buying 
Agency’s  Total 
RCOSW Large Contracts 353,377,257.28 552,693,596.25 63.94%
RCOSW SAP 3,895,913.20 552,693,596.25 0.70%
RCOSW GSA purchases 195,420,425.77 552,693,596.25 35.36%
FSSG 
deployed 




SAP 483,583,137.62 483,902,560.02 
99.93%
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are much more prominent than the SAP buys.  The largest expenditure by the RCOSW 
was on large contracts (63.94%).   
 
Purchase Agency Amount in U.S. Dollars Percent of Total 
RCOSW 3,895,913.20 1% 
FSSG deployed 483,583,137.62 99% 
Overall SAP total 487,479,050.82 100% 








Figure 4.   Diagram of Percent of SAP Purchases Made From Each Agency to 
Overall Total 
 
Table 6 and Figure 4 depict the SAP dollar value split by user.  It is clear that the 
FSSG deployed used SAP far more than the RCOSW in terms of total dollar expenditure, 




Commercial Items Total Items 
Purchased 
% of Purchases that are 
Commercial Items: 
RCOSW 497,291,833.25 552,693,596.25 90%
FSSG deployed 483,902,560.02 483,902,560.02 100%
Table 7.   Percent Commercial Items Within Agency (For Assessment, GSA is 















Figure 5.   Diagram of Percent Commercial items Within Agency (For Assessment, 
GSA is Considered Commercial Item) 
 
Table 7 and Figure 5 show the percent, by dollar value, of items purchased that 
are considered commercial items/services.  Only commercial items/services are eligible 
for SAP under the test case in FAR 13.5, so this is an important distinction.  As shown in 
the table, 90% of the RCOSW and 100% of the FSSG deployed purchases fell into the 
category of commercial items or services.  This means that 90% of the RCOSW and 
100% of the FSSG deployed purchases could have been made using SAP.  This clearly 
demonstrates the need to examine Simplified Acquisitions of commercial items because 
this is where the majority of U.S. procurement dollars are spent.  Any policy affecting 
these purchases will have huge economic impacts on the American economy.  If small 
businesses and more competition are involved, acquisition dollars spent in these areas 
have the potential to impact companies’ profits, manpower levels, number of employees, 
and benefits offered to those employed.  Almost every purchase in some way was a 
commercial item bought on the economy, which is an enormous amount of money. 
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% of Purchase Non-
commercial Items: 
RCOSW $55,401,763.00 552,693,596.25 10%
FSSG 0 483,902,560.02 0%
Table 8.   Percent Non-Commercial Items Within Agency (For Assessment, GSA is 















Figure 6.   Diagram of Percent Non-Commercial items Within Agency: (For 
Assessment, GSA is Considered Commercial Item) 
 
Table 8 and Figure 6 show the opposite of Table 6 and Figure 4.  It simply shows 
that 10% of the RCOSW purchases were not considered commercial items/services.  This 
amount of money must be spent in the traditional way.   
D. WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN? 
The overall conclusions from these charts and diagrams is that 90% of 
acquisitions made by the largest contracting office in the Marine Corps, which spans west 
from the Mississippi river under I MEF’s control, are commercial items. For the three 
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years analyzed, 66% of the total dollars spent by the RCOSW and FSSG deployed were 
spent using SAP.  This in itself shows a significant portion of spending already uses SAP.  
The question is what is going on with the other 34% of dollars spent for commercial 
items that were not purchased using SAP?  This represents a significant dollar value of 
$352,442,693.  How is this money being spent?  The data indicates that this 
$352,442,693 is being spent using traditional contract methods, even though they fit the 
criteria of the FAR 13.5 test program and could have been bought using SAP.  This is the 
motivation for this project.  If legislation permits SAP to be used for these purchases, 
why isn’t the RCOSW taking advantage of it?  Chapter V will examine what is currently 







IV. CURRENT PROCEDURES AT THE RCOSW  
This chapter captures a snapshot of the current procedures and steps the RCOSW 
in Camp Pendleton, CA follows when a procurement request is received.  It depicts the 
current decision tree (Figure 7) of all the steps a request makes along its journey to a final 
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V. POLICY AND PROCEDURES THAT INFLUENCE SAP USE 
This chapter examines the actual fleet practices with respect to SAP use.  The 
regulating documents (FAR, DFAR, NMCAG, MAPS etc.) are examined for specific 
instructions pertaining to SAP.  Some inconsistencies were found between documents 
and policies.  Interviews were conducted with key personnel at the headquarters of the 
Marine Corps to find out the intention of the policy writers at the service level.  This 
section both examines the written documents as well as the procedural steps in practice at 
examined units.  
The FAR Part 13 does not possess nearly an extensive enough explanation of SAP 
to fully be incorporated into everyday policy.   FAR Part 13.002 states the purpose of 
Simplified Acquisitions is to: 
 
(a) Reduce administrative costs;                                                                                               
(b) Improve opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, women-owned, 
Veteran-owned, HUB Zone, and service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business concerns to obtain a fair proportion of Government contracts; 
(c) Promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and 
(d) Avoid unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors. [15] 
 
The FAR is vague at best in its explanation of how this purpose should be 
enacted.   There is only an explanation of what SAP is to be used for, what the purpose is, 
and why and how the SAP came about.  There is no specific explanation of how SAP is 
to be implemented into full service.  Due to the modifications the DAR council made in 
the FAR language, the FAR (part 13.5) is limited in detail of what procedures and 
documents are no longer required under the test case.  In addition to the lack of 
instruction, there is no provision designed to review overall affects of the test program to 
ensure it is in fact the most economical way of doing business. “GAO was unable to 
determine the extent to which federal executive agencies-including DOD- have used the 
test program and have realized any benefits." [19]  
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Policies at both the FAR and DFAR were examined and found to inadequately 
explain the processes, procedures, and documentation no longer required.  Policy at the 
federal level in the FAR and DFAR should reflect the intent of legislation.  Industry 
knows exactly what accounting standards they no longer need to apply to a commercial 
item sale, and they also know that they no longer need to provide certified cost and 
pricing data and many other documents which were formerly required.  Industry had 
lobbied government legislators for years to change these rules to save money and reduce 
paperwork and regulations.  Because of the intense lobbying by major defense industry 
corporations, the FAR specifically lays out what laws are no longer applicable to 
commercial items.  The FAR is very clear and lists each non-applicable law individually.    
The modifications directed towards the contracting officer are, however, much 
more vague and open to interpretation by each person along the chain of command.   
There was a shift in thought, or at the very least, a contradiction in policy at the 
high levels, as demonstrated in the next step of acquisition policy guides.  This is where 
the policy begins to modify.  
The DoN EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A (Department of the Navy, E-business 
operations office of instructions) states, “The purchase card may be used as a method of 
payment in conjunction with other contracting methods above the micro-purchase 
threshold up to $9,999,900 depending on the type of contracting vehicle utilized, with the 
appropriate delegation of authority from the Head of the Contracting Activity.” [20]  This 
limit is up to 5 million for commercial items.  However, the Marine Corps Acquisitions 
Procedures Supplement dated April 6, 2005 immediately follows a reference to the 
4200.1A with the following: “Within the Marine Corps utilizing the GCPC as a method 
of payment above the micro-purchase threshold is not preferred and should only be done 
when no other means of contract payment is feasible and/or practicable.” [17]  This 
thought was not expressed in the 4200.1A.   
A closer look was made at service level policy for clarification.  The Navy Marine 
Corps Acquisition Guide dated November 2003 (and revised February 14, 2005) made 
only a single mention of simplified acquisitions, under the prompt payment section, as 
also falling under the prompt payment rules.  Simplified acquisitions were not mentioned 
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in any other location.  Part G5212 Acquisition of Commercial Items, subpart G5212.90--
Innovative Commercial Contracting Techniques, G5212.9000 Model Commercial 
Contracting Strategy, mentions purchasing commercial items, but primarily discusses 
ways to be innovative and cover all the requirements and never mentions simplified 
acquisitions [21].  The MAPS mentions SAP, but it further restricts the instructions from 
the NMCAG, as discussed later in this chapter.  
The modification continued at the lower level.  On Camp Pendleton’s web page 
there is a section called doing business with Camp Pendleton and is the RCO information 
site.  This site lists types of procurements, including simplified acquisitions, along with 
negotiated and sealed bid.  It gives the following description: “Simplified acquisition 
methods are used for all open market procurements under $100,000, and purchases for 
supplies or services placed against an established contract or with Government sources.” 
[22]  Simplified acquisitions encompass four approaches: 
1. Micro-Purchase  
2. Purchase Orders  
3. Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA)  
4. Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) Program   
The Camp Pendleton (RCOSW) procedures mention the micro-purchase threshold 
of $2,500 often, and give detailed procedures for those purchases [23].  All micro-
purchases are encouraged to be bought on government purchase cards through simplified 
acquisitions at every possible situation, at the lowest buyer in the chain of command with 
authorization. This was addressed in many locations throughout the internal operating 
procedures as well as in the web site.  In the micro-purchase arena, simplified 
acquisitions are encouraged as per the intent of the legislations, and it is reflected via 
actual purchases.   
RCOSW purchase orders seem to follow the intent of the legislation, but only up 
to $100,000.  Their policy defines purchase orders as the acquisition of supplies or 
services, the aggregate amount of which exceeds $2,500, but does not exceed $100,000 
and a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), which a large contract is defined as and small 
purchases are made against it when needed.  A simplified method of filling anticipated 
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repetitive needs for supplies or services is establishing "charge accounts" with qualified 
sources of supply [22].  These two sections follow the original intent of the legislators.  
The RCOSW website states GCPC is “…utilized by RCO buyers for many other 
simplified acquisition procurements.  This procedure allows authorized Government 
personnel to use the card to buy goods in the same manner that private citizens utilize 
their credit card. The process is expeditious and economical for both the vendor and the 
Government...”  [22]  It does not go into any detail about the upper thresholds, but does 
mention simplified acquisitions.  The how-to and limits are vague under this part, so one 
is forced to refer back to the simplified acquisitions section where it lists the upper limit 
of $100,000.   
According to the RCOSW internal operating procedures for the GCPC, there is 
only one mention of simplified acquisitions using the GCPC above the micro-purchase 
level.  It states that participants in the GCPC program with authority above the micro-
purchase level must complete CON 237, simplified acquisitions training on-line [23].   
A. WHAT DOES ALL OF THIS MEAN FOR THE ACTUAL PRACTICE OF 
THE RCOSW?     
Based on interviews with civilian contract staff as well as Marine personnel in 
October of 2005, it appears that simplified acquisitions are being used often, but only to 
the cost limit of $100,000 on a regular basis.  Anything below $100,000 is sent to the 
SAP branch if it in fact can be purchased through simplified acquisitions.  Anything 
requested beyond that price, if not a commercial item or if it is complex in nature, is 
forwarded to the major contracts division to be competed in the formal way, as with a 
negotiation or a sealed bid contract.  GCPC for micro-purchases at or below $2,500 are 
also regularly used but more at individual command levels.  Any simplified acquisitions 
above $2,500 are initiated at the contracting office, where they employ simplified 
acquisitions to the utmost extent until the $100,000 threshold.  If above $100,000, the 
request is transferred to the formal contracts division for action.  If it is brought to the 
formal contracts division, even if it is a SAP purchase, a business clearance memorandum 
is started and evaluation criteria decided before the award process is determined.  All 
processing and associated documents are performed for all purchases over $100,000 and 
complex buys, even if it is under the 13.5 test case.  For any request over one million 
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dollars, MAPS adds yet another step.  After the previously mentioned documents are 
completed, the file must then be sent to the headquarters of the Marine Corps for 
additional approval.  This is time consuming and defiantly more paperwork.  This is 
required for any purchase over one million dollars, even if it is being bought under the 
simplified acquisitions test case and is being purchased quickly.   
After extensive interviews with personnel in the RCOSW, a common perception 
about simplified acquisitions emerged, and that is there is nothing simple about 
simplified acquisitions.  This was said by more than 75% of the personnel during the 
interviews.  The supervisor who handles the formal contracting division stated that the 
RCOSW utilizes simplified acquisition to the fullest extent possible.  Yet this same 
person also mentioned that the only difference between the formal contract procedure for 
other types of contracts such as negotiated or sealed bid and sealed bid procedures was 
that the sub-elements in the selection criteria are not as detailed.  This is not the case if 
you read section 13.5 of the FAR, but in reality there is not much difference from the 
contracting officer’s point of view.  The FAR is not clear on what is no longer required, 
so the safe risk-averse path is to do everything that has been traditionally required, as this 
guards against accusations of cutting corners or proceeding counter to the FAR rules.  
The idea of complexity was also mentioned as a reason for sending a SAP 
purchase to the formal contracts division.  The general consensus in the facility was that 
most Marines who work in the SAP division were not experienced and trained enough to 
handle complex buys, even commercial items under $50,000.  This idea will be further 
examined in chapter VI. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Considering the entire contracting office, a few issues surfaced.  The SAP relief 
given by legislation is not being exploited to the fullest extent, and there are significant 
reasons why all acquisitions above $100K are treated as formal contracts.   
The $100K threshold was originally included as a SAP threshold limit, but, the 
system was already in place and was not changed when the threshold changed for other 
reasons or through the test program in FAR 13.5.   It has become more of an experience 
issue, as the RCOSW interprets that the MAPS requirement for any contract over $100K 
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includes a business plan and other associated paperwork, which, makes the contract 
formulation process more complex and thus appropriate to be written in the formal 
contract division.  It makes perfect sense to keep things as they are if the requirements 
have not significantly lessened.  To ensure all traditional requirements are covered is the 
risk-averse course of action.  A prudent caretaker of the taxpayer’s dollars would avoid 
possible risks of unfair actions, overspending, or lack of competition.  Naturally, things 
that are important under traditional procurement methods and are not specifically 
identified as unnecessary will surface within the interpretation of those with past 
experiences.  Thus, a new hybrid SAP-traditional method of procurement was formed.  
Upon this discovery, the source of the more complex contracts was investigated. 
MAPS, Part 15.406-90 Documentation, deals with business clearances.  It states that:   
In all acquisitions greater than $100,000, the Contracting Officer will 
prepare a Business Clearance Memorandum (BCM) following the format 
found at Appendix K.  [17]   
It was referenced from the NMCAG, G5215.406-90.  However, in the NMCAG, 
there is a slight variation to that statement, but the one word difference has a tremendous 
effect.  Also, there is no Appendix K template in the MAPS.  The NMCAG which was 
referenced incorrectly in the MAPS says: 
... (a) Generally, 'pre-negotiation' and 'post-negotiation' business 
clearances are required for each negotiated contract action.  Business 
clearance memoranda (BCM) document the basis for approval of the 
action, and the basis for determination that the negotiated prices are fair 
and reasonable.” [21] 
The one word difference makes a large impact on the way the business processes 
of the ROSCW are based.  NMCAG only requires a BCM for negotiated contracts, while 
SAP contracts over $100K should not require a BCM.  If a SAP contract over $100K is 
handled the same way as a less complex purchase, it could be processed by Marines in 
the SAP branch.   
C. CLARIFICATION OF INTENT OF POLICY:  
Due to the inconsistent SAP interpretation by the high-ranking policy makers at 
the RCOSW, clarification was needed.  Mr. Asad at HQMC is the head of the contracting 
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section for the Marine Corps, and Mr. Asad identified Mr. John Marshall as the person 
who wrote the MAPS policy.  When John Marshall was interviewed7 by phone in 
October 2005, he confirmed that he helped write the MAPS policy.   Mr. Marshall stated 
that the failure to print the word negotiated was not meant to increase workload, and it 
was not the intent of the MAPS paragraph to treat all commercial items over $100K as 
large contracts.  He stated that there will eventually be a template for the BCM as an 
appendix to the MAPS, but as of now there is not an appendix insert, as noted in the 
quote.  He said that the term BCM was being used in a generic sense as just a 
requirement to document the requirements in FAR part 13.5.  He also mentioned that his 
supervisor was the official who could make a final determination of the intent.   
Mary Overstreet is that supervisor.  She was interviewed8 and asked the same 
questions about the intent of the paragraph in the MAPS.  She discussed how supervisors 
in the chain of command had the right to further restrict some liberties of an individual 
contracting office if needed.  The policy requiring any acquisition over one million 
dollars to obtain HQMC approval came from this thinking.  She stated that when HQMC 
started to review the contracts over the million dollars threshold, they discovered 
mistakes that needed to be corrected.  There was a benefit to increased supervision by 
“having another set of eyes” look over the file prior to award.   This was also the intent of 
requiring a business clearance approved by someone higher than the contract specialist or 
contracting officer for all procurements above $100,000, even SAP buys under the FAR 
13.5 test case. 
Ms. Overstreet stated it was not the same as the business clearance mentioned in 
the NMCAG G5215.406-90, but was more of a generic term to describe a summary.  She 
mentioned that the business clearance documents all of the information on how the 
procurement was made and the story of how and what was done, which documents why 
the decision was made as it was.  She mentioned that this was the intent, and that the 
extra set of eyes is a good thing. 
                                                 
7 Interview with John Marshall at HQMC via phone in October 2005. 
8 Interview with Mary Overstreet at HQMC via phone in November 2005. 
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The only documents specifically expressed in FAR 13.5, except for a sole source 
justification, are: 
“(1) A brief written description of the procedures used in awarding the 
contract, including the fact that the test procedures in FAR subpart 13.5 
were used; 
(2) The number of offers received; 
(3) An explanation, tailored to the size and complexity of the acquisition, 
of the basis for the contract award decision; and 
(4) Any justification approved under paragraph (a) of this section.” [15] 
Ms. Overstreet indicated that these documents would be part of the business 
clearance.  She mentioned that the business clearance should follow the template in 
NAVSUP 4200.82D, but that a MAPS template was not yet created.  As the overall 
supervisor for writing Marine Corps policy, her interpretation reflects what the fleet 
offices in the Marine Corps will do, and some would agree that additional oversight in the 
acquisition process is a good thing.  This interview indicates that the official policy of the 
Marine Corps prescribes to this theory. 
Dr. Gansler is a notorious proponent of many acquisition initiatives, one of which 
is using the SAP test case under FAR 13.5.  In an interview with Professor Cory Yoder 
from the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Gansler stated that he believes the true intention 
and the correct interpretation of FAR 13.5 should be to perform a SAP buy of a 
commercial item over $100,000 exactly the same way as a SAP buy of $50,000.  The 
process should be the same.  No additional requirements should be added to the process.   
The true question that needs to be answered is whether or not the Marine Corps 
want to utilize the SAP procedures to their full potential for commercial items over 
$100,000.    The RCOSW is assigning workload based on extra effort and paperwork 
required by MAPS.  Current interpretations make purchases over $100,000 more 
complex than can be handled by the normal SAP procedures in the SAP branch.  If the 
Marine Corps wants to fully capitalize on the SAP legislation, it will need to adjust the 
MAPS process protocol. 
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VI. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OUTSIDE OF POLICY 
This chapter examines forces affecting the implementation of the full SAP 
procedures outside of the policy and document requirement confusion.  This chapter will 
look at other significant factors that contribute to the decision to divide the RCOSW into 
SAP and large contracts divisions using the $100K dollar threshold and complexity, 
rather than fully capitalizing on the SAP procedures.  The procurement references are one 
reason but there is also another reason.  Experience is another very real reason that faces 
the RCOSW.  This chapter will paint a fuller picture of the reasons that the Marine Corps 
does not fully capitalize on the SAP legislation intent.  
A. INITIAL EDUCATION 
The contract specialist Military Occupation Specialist (MOS) for the Marine 
Corps is not a primary MOS that is granted to Marines out of boot camp.  Marines 
initially enter the contracting field as Sergeants and then learn through on-the-job training 
(OJT) until they have fulfilled the requirements to become certified.  There is no formal 
enlisted MOS producing school that Marines attend to learn the basic of contracting prior 
to working in a contracting office.  No standardized course of instruction or allotted 
learning time is granted to those becoming contracting specialists.  Once a Marine is 
selected to become a contract specialist, he or she is removed from his or her former 
MOS and assigned to his or her new assignment as a contract specialist.  A newly 
arriving Marine is then assessed and given an overall training guideline per his or her 
assessment from the more experienced contract personnel.  At this point the reality of the 
situation is explained.  
B. EXPECTATIONS 
A new Marine who has been selected into the contract specialist MOS is told what 
is expected in his/her new assignment in order to be successful.  Among other 
requirements, he/she is to maintain his/her basic military training requirements, annual 
training, and all military commitments.  This is a requirement for all Marines.  In addition 
to the military commitments, he/she must take specific Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) classes to obtain a certification for a warrant.  These classes are to fit into his/her 
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off-time, outside of the normal workday.  The Marine is also required to obtain 24 credit 
hours of college level business studies.   This can be done at the university or college of 
the Marine’s choosing.  Once again, this is to be accomplished in the Marine’s off-time.  
All of these requirements are to be satisfied simultaneously and as fast as possible.  The 
Marine is still expected to deploy as a Marine would in the normal deployment cycle.  
With the global war on terrorism (GWOT), deployments are often for a contract 
specialist.  In some MOS’ like infantry, there is a set time for recovery and training of 
new Marines before a unit is expected to perform their next deployment.  With support 
MOSs, this is not a luxury that is commonly experienced.  Support MOSs are, as a whole, 
understaffed and in great demand.  The deployment turnaround time for a support MOS 
may be months rather than years.  With all of these requirements put on new Marines as 
they are first entering the career field, it takes a few years for even the brightest Marines 
to obtain a warrant.  
Appendix D shows a report that is required by HQMC from each contracting 
office.  It contains exact information as to which Marines and civilians are warranted at 
what level as well as their education.  Specific names have been blacked out for 
confidentiality, but this is the actual information provided to HQMC by the RCOSW 
Deputy Director. One can see from examining the document that the majority of non-
warranted people are newer and lower ranked Marines.  This was supported by the 
Deputy Director in interviews concerning the certification process for new Marines in the 
field.  The Deputy Director has gone on record as stating this situation is a problem 
affecting the ability to send fully qualified, trained, certified or warranted contract 
specialists on each deployment.  The Deputy Director of the RCOSW, Terri Zimmerman, 
has requested that Head Quarter Marine Corps (HQMC) standardize and allow Marines 
to get their required education all at once, like other MOS schools and fields allow.  The 
body of this request is included as Appendix E.   
C. EFFECTS OF THIS PROBLEM 
The lack of education and training that Marines bring with them as they report to 
their first contract specialist assignment increases the workload of those already qualified.  
It asks the new Marines to perform at an overload level where training can not be 
accomplished in less than a few years.   Prior to deployment in the Marine’s normal 
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deployment cycle, the Marine is asked to learn at a level that would burn-out the best and 
the brightest of any institution.  By the time the Marine is ready to deploy, he/she is worn 
thin from operating at such a high stress level for so long.  The deployment is simply 
another step built on an already bad situation.  When this same Marine returns home, 
instead of a much needed break, training resumes where it had been left prior to 
deployment.  The Marine’s non-deployment time is no longer a break from stress and 
time away from family and friends.  There is not an adequate “break” period to 
recuperate from the effects of long-term stress.  The very nature of the Marine Corps is to 
have a higher relative proportion of lower ranking Marines.  As a result, the majority of 
Marines are being trained on the basics most of the time.  Considering the time it takes to 
train and warrant Marines, they usually rotate prior to truly mastering their assignment.  
This perpetuates putting the untrained Marines into positions of authority without the 
background to be effective.  Situations are possible, where a Staff NCO, who is expected 
to be an expert in their field, has not been fully trained and now must assist with the 
training of others.  This affects the overall function of any office. 
D. WHO WORKS THE CONTRACTS? 
Only Marines tend to work the simpler contracts, due to this overall level of in-
experience.  These simpler contracts are put into the SAP branch for purchase (if they 
qualify).  A more complicated SAP purchase requires more experience in some areas, and 
therefore more experienced contracting personnel would handle them.  This leads to a 
naturally occurring shift in contract assignment.  The more complicated contracts shift 
divisions to where the personnel are more experienced.  In this situation, the purchase 
requests are processed through the formal contracts division.   The personnel that work in 
the formal contract division have a higher level of experience and are almost exclusively 
permanent civilian contract specialists.  This is a major reason why contracts that could 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT  
It is clear that the United States Marine Corps as a whole, and specifically the 
RCOSW, are not fully capitalizing on the legislative intent of the Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures.  There are many reasons why the legislation is not being fully exploited, and 
this project examined a few.  This chapter recommends possible solutions to correct 
discrepancies found during the analysis.  This chapter highlights specific problems and 
recommends a course of action to better correlate actions with the intent of the 
legislation.  
 
Problem 1:  The lack of emphasis on using SAP. 
Situation 1:  The policy is written to encourage SAP whenever possible.  
However, SAP is mostly being used for purchases under $100K.  SAP purchases 
above $100K are being sent to the formal contracts division. 
Recommendation 1:  Emphasize the requirement to use SAP whenever possible.  
If the item being purchased qualifies under the test program, stipulate that SAP 
must be used.   Only exceptions, which are justified individually and approved 
through a higher official, should use anything other than SAP.  Special emphasis 
and training must be conducted to emphasize that only the requirements of FAR 
part 13.5 will be performed.  No additional approvals, documents, or plans should 
be required for the SAP purchase under the test program, regardless of dollar 
amount. 
 
Problem 2:  Inconsistent messages being sent by different publications throughout the 
DOD in reference to SAP. 
Situation 2:  There are inconsistent instructions between the FAR and contracting 
officer policies.  The interpretation of the NMCAG is further restricted in the 
MAPS acquiring safeguards not originally intended by the legislation of 
Congressman Davis. 
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Recommendation 2:   Reconcile all requirement documents and laws to ensure 
the same message is being sent by all publications.  Ensure all contracting offices 
utilize SAP to the fullest extent, and that no additional oversight documentation is 
added.  Immediate corrective changes should be incorporated into to the MAPS, 
and what is no longer required should be explained. 
 
Problem 3:  FAR is not clear on what documents and steps are no longer required of 
contract officers using SAP.   
Situation 3:  The FAR is vague on what is no longer required when using SAP, 
so it is left to individual interpretations along with interpretations of those along 
the chain of command.  The result is a hybrid version of the original intent and 
traditional procedures.  The true SAP legislation is not being followed. 
Recommendation 3:  The FAR should outline exactly which steps are required 
under SAP, and which are no longer needed by the contracting officer, as this is 
not present in the current FAR.  A new section should be dedicated to procedures 
no longer applicable and it should mirror the section of the FAR identifying the 
laws which are now no longer applicable under the reform. 
 
Problem 4:  The MAPS further constricts the intent of the NMCAG and SAP legislation.  
Situation 4:  The MAPS takes the stance that all acquisitions over $100K need to 
perform a business clearance, which is essentially a fully documented summary of 
everything in the process and a stand-alone explanation of all that happened 
during the purchase.  The intent is to have another set of eyes applying oversight 
to all purchases over $100K.  It further restricts all purchases over 1 million 
dollars as they require approval by HQMC. 
Recommendation 4:  The Marine Corps Procedures Supplemental (MAPS) 
needs to be updated to reflect the overall goal of the legislation.  The MAPS 
should not further restrict the NMCAG to induce a business clearance for all 
acquisitions above $100K, and should truly encourage making purchases using 
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SAP.  Restrictions imposed by the MAPS need to be changed to fully capitalize 
on SAP legislation.  The only required documents, per the FAR part 13.5, are and 
should remain: 
“Contract file documentation. The contract file must include—  
(1) A brief written description of the procedures used in awarding 
the contract, including the fact that the test procedures in 
FAR Subpart 13.5 were used;  
(2) The number of offers received;  
(3) An explanation, tailored to the size and complexity of the 
acquisition, of the basis for the contract award decision; and  
(4) Any justification approved under paragraph (a) of this section” 
[Appendix B] 
 
Problem 5:  No formal contract award information is captured for SAP test procedures 
reviews at program end.  This problem has also been noted in a GAO report referenced in 
chapter V [19]. 
Situation 5:  Congress has authorized a test program under FAR part 13.5, but no 
data is being collected to confirm or disprove if SAP is a more efficient way of 
performing contracts. 
Recommendation 5:   Require all contracting offices to report data back to DOD 
about the use and effectiveness of the test program.  Lack of any information has 
precluded an in-depth analysis of SAP effectiveness for purchasing commercial 
items.   
 
Problem 6: Threshold limits of SAP were raised in accordance with the realities of 
today’s market, but other limits, such as the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) 
threshold, have not changed. 
Situation 6:  The requirement of full and open competition (in practice as 
advertised on websites like FEDBIZOPS) is required of anything above $25,000.  
This original amount was created by statue in the original law, and has not been 
updated as other statutory requirements have been adjusted and raised. CICA 
needs to be updated per the SAP thresholds. 
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Recommendation 6:  Raise the CICA threshold from $25,000 to match the 
original SAP threshold amount of $100,000.  This will truly simplify acquisitions 
in the SAP branch.   This is not to say that competition should not be used to the 
fullest extent, but it will make the contracting officer’s judgment on the most 
appropriate course of action more influential.  This will impact the use of best 
commercial practices in a dramatic and useful way. 
 
Problem 7:  Although not a statutory requirement, the culture of a $2,500 dollar limit for 
micro-purchases has rooted itself in the internal operating procedures of the Marine 
Corps, as referenced in chapter V. 
Situation 7:  The culture of checks and balances and wanting to avoid trouble has 
prevailed in the Marine Corps to where micro-purchases are very limited and 
oversight is tremendous. The Marine Corps trusts Battalion Commanders with the 
lives of hundreds of Marines, but it does not trust them to approve buys above the 
$2,500 level.  This is an obvious discrepancy. 
Recommendation 7:  Raise the micro-purchase level from $2,500 to a $50,000 
threshold.  This is in keeping with the times of current acquisition policies.   After 
the amount is raised, ensure that it is used throughout the Marine Corps and not 
further restricted as it currently is. 
 
Problem 8:  No specialized training with the emphasis on SAP. 
Situation 8:  Many Marines do not understand the use, requirements, and inter-
workings of SAP.  This leads to dependence on more experienced civilian 
contract specialists for guidance.  This creates a culture of doing it the ways of the 
past, as many of these civilian contract specialists began their training 20 years 
ago. 
Recommendation 8:  Train Marines.  The more training the younger generation 
receives, the more current and practical best business practices will be used.  If 
processes are to be modernized, Marines must be trained to think and act 
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creatively and with ingenuity.  The Marine Corps is based on letting the Marines 
know the objective and running with it to create wonderful outcomes.  However, 
the contract specialist field is not doing this, as Marines are tied to the experience 
of others rather than leading and being innovative as the FAR demands. 
 
Problem 9:  No formal school to train contract specialists. 
Situation 9:  The problem was further explained in chapter V.  The basic issue is 
that the Marine Corps is not training its contract specialists to the extent required 
to perform the job well. 
Recommendation 9:  Have all Marines go into the contract specialist field and 
complete formal schooling prior to arriving at their duty station.  Allow an entry 
level MOS to be obtained by the formal school where the Marine will receive 
training and certification in DAU course requirements.  Once the Marine arrives 
for his/her OJT, he/she should have a good understanding of contracting and be 
able to learn more effectively.  The overload of requirements is also lessened on 
Marines, allowing them to complete the 24 hours of required college level 
business training earlier in their career.  Once the Marine is warranted and gains 
some experience, he/she can be placed in more complex areas and will be better 
rounded as a contracting specialist.  This would also provide the fleet a more 
capable Marine for deployment.  With these changes, the SAP threshold of 5 
million should actually be processed in the SAP branch with the SAP personnel, 
as the Marines would have the training and experience needed to conduct those 
purchases.   
 
Problem 10:  Marines enter the field of contract specialist at too high of a rank to be used 
to their highest potential. 
Situation 10:  Marines currently enter into the field at the rank of Sergeant and it 
takes years to be fully trained.  This creates SNCOs with little practical 
experience. 
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Recommendation 10:  Allow entry into the MOS as Corporals versus Sergeants.  
NCOs in general have the maturity needed to be effective and this would help to 
train Marines at a younger rank.   Allow a six month non-deployment period 
when a Marine, under the rank of GySgt, checks into a unit to learn OJT prior to 
beginning the deployment cycle.  This would create better and more fully trained 
Marines as the backbone of the contract specialist field, rather than Marines who 
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APPENDIX B (FAR REFERENCE 13.005) 
 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 List of Inapplicable Laws. 
 
(a) The following laws are inapplicable to all contracts and subcontracts (if otherwise 
applicable to subcontracts) at or below the simplified acquisition threshold: 
 
        (1)   41 U.S.C. 57(a) and (b) (Anti-Kickback Act of 1986). (Only the requirement 
for the incorporation of the contractor procedures for the prevention and 
detection of violations, and the contractual requirement for contractor 
cooperation in investigations are inapplicable.). 
       (2)   40 U.S.C. 270a (Miller Act). (Although the Miller Act does not apply to 
contracts at or below the simplified acquisition threshold, alternative forms of 
payment protection for suppliers of labor and material (see 28.102) are still 
required if the contract exceeds $25,000.). 
       (3)   40 U.S.C. 327 -- 333 (Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act -- 
Overtime Compensation). 
       (4)   41 U.S.C. 701(a)(1) (Section 5152 of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988), 
except for individuals. 
       (5)    42 U.S.C. 6962 (Solid Waste Disposal Act). (The requirement to provide an 
estimate of recovered material utilized in contract performance does not apply 
unless the contract value exceeds $100,000.) 
       (6)    10 U.S.C. 2306(b) and 41 U.S.C. 254(a) (Contract Clause Regarding 
Contingent Fees). 
       (7)    10 U.S.C. 2313 and 41 U.S.C. 254(c) (Authority to Examine Books and 
Records of Contractors). 
       (8)    10 U.S.C. 2402 and 41 U.S.C. 253g (Prohibition on Limiting Subcontractor 
Direct Sales to the United States). 
       (9)    15 U.S.C. 631 note (HUBZone Act of 1997), except for 15 U.A.C. 
657a(b)(2)(B), which is optional for the agencies subject to the requirements of 
the Act. 
      (10)   31 U.S.C. 1354(a) (Limitation on use of appropriated funds for contracts with 
entities not meeting veterans’ employment reporting requirements). 
 
(b) The Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council will include any law enacted after 
October 13, 1994, that sets forth policies, procedures, requirements, or restrictions for the 
acquisition of property or services, on the list set forth in paragraph (a) of this section. 
The FAR Council may make exceptions when it determines in writing that it is in the best 
interest of the Government that the enactment should apply to contracts or subcontracts 
not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold. 
 
(c) The provisions of paragraph (b) of this section do not apply to laws that -- 
 
(1)    Provide for criminal or civil penalties; or 
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       (2)   Specifically state that notwithstanding the language of Section 4101, Public  
Law 103-355, the enactment will be applicable to contracts or subcontracts in 
amounts not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold. 
 
(d) Any individual may petition the Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(OFPP), to include any applicable provision of law not included on the list set forth in 
paragraph (a) of this section unless the FAR Council has already determined in writing 
that the law is applicable. The Administrator, OFPP, will include the law on the list in 
paragraph (a) of this section unless the FAR Council makes a determination that it is 
applicable within 60 days of receiving the petition. 
 
13.006 -- Inapplicable Provisions and Clauses. 
While certain statutes still apply, pursuant to Public Law 103-355, the following 
provisions and clauses are inapplicable to contracts and subcontracts at or below the 
simplified acquisition threshold: 
 
    (a) 52.203-5, Covenant Against Contingent Fees. 
    (b) 52.203-6, Restrictions on Subcontractor Sales to the Government. 
    (c) 52.203-7, Anti-Kickback Procedures. 
    (d) 52.215-2, Audits and Records -- Negotiation. 
    (e) 52.222-4, Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act -- Overtime  
Compensation. 
    (f) 52.223-6, Drug-Free Workplace, except for individuals. 
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as of Semester Education  
Name Series Grade Birth Service MOS Rank Level Achieved 
30-
Sep Hours Level  
MCB, CAMP 
PENDLETON            
Anderson, 
Michael          9656 O-5 5 MIL C-2 68 Y 17 DEPLOYED
Barrett, 
Barbara 1102 9 1953 29      SAT C-2 137.5 Y 9  
Britton, Dewan      3044 E-5 SAT NONE 80 Y 9 MLG 
Burnham, 
James 1102 12 1956 5      5 MIL C-III 80 Y 13  
Burroughs, 
Joseph         9656 O-4 1 MIL C-2 15 Y 17 I MEF 
Cavadias, 
John 1102 12 1956 13      Unlimited C-III 108 Y 17  
Clark, 
Frederick         3044 E-6 SAT C-2 80 Y 9 MLG 
Clark, Melissa 1102 9 1977 4      SAT P-II 80 Y 11  
Deleon, Benny         3044 E-6 SAT NONE 80 N 9 MLG 
Estrada, Capt 
Amador         9656 O-4 SAT C-2 0 Y 17  
Determan, 
Pok-Su 1105 7 1946 21      SAT P-III 90 Y 9  
Estrada, Capt 
Amador         9656 O-4 SAT C-2 0 Y 17  
Haines, John         3044 E-5 NONE NONE NONE N 7  
Ham, Kevin 1105 6 1954 12      SAT None 204.5 0 3  
Haines, John         3044 E-5 NONE NONE NONE N 7  
Hammonds 1105 7 1962 2     NONE NONE  12 10  
 54




Bus   








as of Semester Education  
Name Series Grade Birth Service MOS Rank Level Achieved 
30-
Sep Hours Level  
MCB, CAMP 
PENDLETON            
Hardy, Beverly 1102 12 1948 36      Unlimited C-II 52 Y 7  
Hargrett, Laury         3044 E-9 NONE C-2 40 Y 11  
Hepler, 
William 1102 12 1967 20      5 MIL C-III 225 Y 10  
Higgins, 
Richard A. Jr         3044 E-7 SAT C-I 8 6 7 MLG 
Himes, Shawn         3044 E-5 SAT NONE 80 N 4 MLG 
Howard, 
Franklin         3044 E-5 NONE NONE 80 12 9  
Kehr, 
Jonathan         9656 O-3 5 MIL C-2 80 Y 17 MLG 
King, Pamela 
(Intern) 1102 11 1977 
2yr 4 
mo     1 MIL C-II 80 Y 13  
Knepp, Karen         3044 E-6 SAT C-1 80 Y 13  
Lane, Gary         3044 E-8 SAT C-1 80 Y 10 MLG 
Langdon, 
Patricia 1102 12 1964 24      5 MIL C-3 80 Y 8  
Lopez-Branch, 
Nina         3044 E-6 SAT C-1 80 N 4 MLG 
Mendez, 
Gilbert         3044 E-5 SAT NONE 80 N 8 MLG 
Miller, John         3044 E-6 NONE NONE 80 N 7  
Muchemore, 
Gloria 1102 7 1948 18      SAT C-1 ? Y 7  
Navarro, 
Hector         3044 E-5 NONE NONE 15 N 7  
Pohribnak, 
Joshua         3044 E-5 NONE NONE 0 N 7  
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as of Semester Education  
Name Series Grade Birth Service MOS Rank Level Achieved 
30-
Sep Hours Level  
MCB, CAMP 
PENDLETON            
Reyes, Shirley 
J. 1105 7 1941 20      SAT P-2 80 Y 9  
Scidmore, 
Gary         3000 E-5 NONE NONE 0 Y 14  
Shin, Suzanne 1102 11 1965 10      None None 53 Y 14  
Siegel, Arlene 1102 12 1950 36      5 MIL C-II 16 Y 11  
Small, Troy         3044 E-7 1 MIL C-2 0 Y 14  
Steinbuch, 
Mariam         3044 E-5 SAT C-1 658.4 Y 11  
Vinzant, Judith 1102 9 1947 37      SAT C-2 80 Y 11  
Watts, Will         3044 E-6 SAT C-1 100 6 7 MLG 
Welch, David 1102 12 1959 19      None C-III 37 Y 17  
Wilson, 
Sandra  1102 13 1957 2      5 MIL C-III 318 Y 17  
Zimmerman, 
Teresa 1102 13 1946 38      Unlimited C-III 58.6 Y 10  
             
MCAS, YUMA             
Rowland, 
Lydia 1102 12 1952 29     SAT C-II 80 Y 9  
Cerka, 
Frances 1102 7 1970 2     None None 0 Y 13  
Hutchins, 
Sharon 1105 10 1948 23     SAT P-II 80 Y 4  
McKnight, 
James         3044 E-5 SAT None 0 N 4  
Hicks, Reta 1105 7 1952 19     SAT P-II 21 N 4  
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as of Semester Education  
Name Series Grade Birth Service MOS Rank Level Achieved 
30-
Sep Hours Level  
MCAS, YUMA             
Hodges, 
William 1105 7 1956 2     None None 0 N 4  
             
MCAS, 
MIRAMAR             
Lerma, 
Maricela         3044 MSgt SAT C-I 2 24 13  
Guillot, Hillary         3044 SSgt SAT C-I 25 21 13  
Duran, Cody         3044 Sgt NONE C-1 0 24 14  
Lemmond, 
Barbara 1102 9 1959 23     SAT C-II 73 Wavier 12  
Schmitzer, 
Richard J. 1102 9 1948 17     SAT C-II 34 24 12  
Bradford, 
Elizabeth 1102 9 1952 23     NONE C-1 0 24 13  
             
MCLB, 
BARSTOW             
David A. 
Reeves 1102 12 1955 5     SAT C-II 115.5 Y 17  
Donna 
Peacock 1102 9 1944 20     SAT C-II 37 N 04  
June Henley 1102 7 1956 21     0 C-II, P-I 4 Y 13  
Corinne 
Dorado 1105 5 1973 5     N/A 0 224 N 07  
Kimberly 
Hamilton 1105 7 1948 25     N/A P-I 42 N 07  
Deborah 
Anilao 1106 7 1949 18     N/A N/A N/A N/A 13  
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as of Semester Education  
Name Series Grade Birth Service MOS Rank Level Achieved 
30-
Sep Hours Level  
MCLB, 
BARSTOW             
Barbara 
Rodriguez 1106 7 1950 18     N/A N/A N/A N/A 04  
             
MWTC, 
BRIDGEPORT             
Adams, 
Edmond         3044 Sgt SAT C-11 40 Y 11  
             
8TH MCRD             
Dunn, Jessye 
M 1105 7 1949 22     $25K P-III 80 Y 7  
             
9TH MCRD             
Graham, 
James M. 1105 7 1963 15     $25K P-II 63 Y 13  
               
12TH MCRD             
Broussard, 
Robert         3043 E-8 $25K   40 Y 13  
Oquin, Fran 1105 7 1948 16     $25K   80 Y 10  
             
               
Notes             
DENOTES: 
Employee unavailable due to pending medical 
retirement.       
DENOTES: 
Marine is deployed. Information has not been updated from 


























Subj: Mandatory Education Requirements for Military Personnel in Military 
Occupational Specialty 3044, Purchasing and Contracting 
 
Ref: (a) Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
 (b) Under Secretary of Defense ltr dtd Aug 1, 2003, Subj: Position Category 
Descriptions and Experience, Education and Training Requirements for Fiscal 
Year 2004, Release #04-01 
 (c) Under Secretary of Defense ltr dtd April 10, 2003, Subj: Military Contingency 
Contracting Force Qualifications 
 
1. Background. Reference (a) established mandatory education and training 
requirements for all personnel working in the acquisition field. This requirement 
is updated regularly, as indicated by reference (b). Reference (c) is current 
Department of Defense Policy for military contingency contracting personnel, and 
establishes a different education requirement than exists for civilian counterparts. 
2. Problem.  
a. Enlisted personnel in the Marine Corps, working in the 3044 Purchasing 
and Contracting MOS, are all considered to be contingency contracting 
forces and can be deployed at any time due to world situations. Therefore 
personnel in the 3044 MOS are subject to the requirements established in 
reference (c).  
b. This educational requirement is inconsistent with education requirements 
for enlisted personnel and places an undue burden on these Marines not 
shared by their peers. As a result, for fitness reports, they are judged 
differently by their reporting seniors than non-3044 personnel.  
c. The acquisition community has a mandate that personnel, both civilian 
and military, meet the minimum education requirements before being 
qualified to assume responsibility as a warranted Contracting Officers. 
This is critical to a Marine’s ability to provide support to the customer in 
deployed situations.   
d. Because 3044 Marines deploy for long periods of time in support of world 
situations it is difficult for them to complete the mandatory educational 
and training requirements. 
3. Recommendation. Establish an undergraduate degree certification program for 
enlisted 3044 Marines in the acquisition field that will allow them to go to school 
full time prior to assignment to a Contracting Office. This program would be 
similar to that outlined in MARADMIN 638/02, dated 12/03/2002, Subj: 
Academic Year 2003-2004 Undergraduate/Graduate Intelligence Program. 
a. Certificate Program. This is not a degree program. It a professional 
development program for Marines entering the 3044 Purchasing and 
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Contracting MOS as a means of acquiring the minimum 24 hours business 
education required by DAWIA. 
b. Individual will have a maximum of 12 months to complete the 24 semester 
hours. He/she will meet monthly with the senior military officer to discuss 
goals and receive guidance. 
c. Individual must be a high school graduate as certified by a secondary 
school diploma or GED. 
d. Successful completion of at least 24 semester hours of college credit, with 
a cumulative GPA of 2.0 or higher on a 4.0 scale (not waiverable). Credit 
must have been earned in residence at a regionally accredited college or 
university. Correspondence or extension credit will not satisfy the 24-hour 
requirement. 
e. Individual will incur 3 years of obligated service (to begin upon 
completion of the certification program).   
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